Search results for "Free will"
showing 10 items of 21 documents
Bioethics and neuroethics
2019
Neuroethics officially appeared at the start of the 21st century due to the progress made by the neurosciences, as an applied ethics related to bioethics, but also as an independent discipline in its own right. As an applied ethics, it tackles issues bordering on bioethics. As independent neuroethics, it deals with established philosophical problems from a neuroscientific standpoint in the broader sense. It involves two central questions: the design of a framework in which to select, interpret and integrate data from neuroscience on morality and outlining the appropriate method or methods for this new branch of knowledge. In both cases, most neuroethicists curiously claim to take a naturali…
Una ciencia admirable: filosofía y admiración en Descartes
2021
RESUMEN Aunque Descartes pretende hablar de cuestiones morales en general, y de las pasiones en particular, como si nadie hubiera escrito antes sobre ellas, lo cierto es que, en el caso de la admiración, es clara su referencia al mundo antiguo. En concreto, en este caso el pensador francés se sitúa críticamente en contra de la postura aristotélica, que entiende la admiración como el inicio de la filosofía. Frente a la propuesta clásica, que convierte dicha emoción en el motor permanente de la investigación de las primeras causas, para Descartes la curiosidad excesiva y el estupor del asombro son rechazables. No obstante, algunos han señalado el carácter ambivalente de las declaraciones cart…
AGI and Machine Consciousness
2012
This review discusses some of main issues to be addressed to design a conscious AGI agent: the agent’s sense of the body, the interaction with the environment, the agent’s sense of time, the free will of the agent, the capability for the agent to have some form of experience, and finally the relationship between consciousness and creativity.
Acting under the idea of freedom: Kant and the Incorporation Thesis
2010
Este artículo examina un supuesto fundamental de la filosofía moral kantiana, a saber: que sin libertad trascendental, entendida como la propiedad de la voluntad por la que se determina a actuar sin ser afectada por resortes sensibles, no se le pueden imputar al presunto agente actos inmorales. Teóricamente se argumenta contra el sentido lógico del supuesto (se revela la consecuencia aporética de la concepción) y se muestra cuán superfluo es en la práctica. De todos modos, se le reconoce a Kant, contra una línea de argumentación nietzscheana bien conocida, el mérito de haber captado el compromiso humano insuperable con la idea de que somos seres discrecionales o libres trascendentalmente. Y…
The Counterfactual Reasoning and the Manipulative Account of Causality: the Origin of Causal Thinking from Free Will
2018
¿Es posible ser moralmente responsable? Notas para una nueva definición del concepto de sujeto
2006
The Strawson´s Basic Argument is the stronger against moral responsibility in Philosophy of action. One should be responsible of his identity to be moral responsible of his actions, but then nobody could be never responsible. In this article I criticize orthodox solutions to Strawson´s sceptical challenge and show how they share with the Argument the same theological notion of monadical agent. A new solution needs a new conception of agent..
Free will and open alternatives
2017
Abstract In her recent book Causation and Free Will, Carolina Sartorio develops a distinctive version of an actual-sequence account of free will, according to which, when agents choose and act freely, their freedom is exclusively grounded in, and supervenes on, the actual causal history of such choices or actions. Against this proposal, I argue for an alternative- possibilities account, according to which agents’ freedom is partly grounded in their ability to choose or act otherwise. Actual-sequence accounts of freedom (and moral responsibility) are motivated by a reflection on so-called Frankfurt cases. Instead, other cases, such as two pairs of examples originally designed by van Inwagen,…
Introduction: responsibility for action and belief
2009
Research on moral responsibility and the related problem of free will is among the liveliest areas in contemporary analytical philosophy. Traditionally, these problems have been dealt with in conne...
¿Tiene arraigo en el cerebro la libertad?
2017
El artículo se propone, en primer lugar, ofrecer un nuevo concepto de naturaleza humana, más allá de la metafísica tradicional y de la interpretación naturalista de las actuales neurociencias, superando así la unilateral apropiación cientificista del concepto de naturaleza humana y defendiendo una biohermenéutica, que cuenta con la pluralidad de perspectivas para comprender la realidad humana, como en el dualismo epistémico habermasiano. En segundo lugar, se indaga si en el cerebro tiene arraigo la libertad en el sentido de «libre albedrío» y de «autonomía», teniendo en cuenta la posición de acreditados neurólogos y el estudio de las disposiciones naturales en la concepción kantiana de la a…
Does Free Will Require Alternative Possibilities?
2017
Abstract In this introductory study I discuss the notion of alternative possibilities and its relation to contemporary debates on free will and moral responsibility. I focus on two issues: whether Frankfurt-style cases refute the principle of alternative possibilities, and whether alternative possibilities are relevant to grounding free will and moral responsibility. With respect to the first issue, I consider three objections to Frankfurt-syle cases: the flicker strategy, the dilemma defense, and the objection from new dispositionalism. With respect to the second issue, I consider the debate between Alternative Possibilities views and Actual Sequence views, as framed by Carolina Sartorio i…